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Abstract 
This paper reassesses Canada’s “coalition crisis” of 2008 through a rhetorical analysis of the national 
addresses of Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Opposition leader Stéphane Dion. Focusing especially upon 
the classical rhetorical categories of ethos (the speaker’s self-identification and positioning relative to the 
audience) and logos (the use of reason in argument), it explores how Harper and Dion construct divergent 
“legitimacy principles” in defence of their positions, arguing that Dion’s speech failed, not merely because of 
the poor production values which dominated commentary at the time, but because of an inferior ethos appeal 
marked by a mishandling of the key rhetorical icon of nationhood. When we consider argumentative 
substance, however, we find that Harper’s address was marred by a misrepresentation of key principles of 
parliamentary government. Because the crisis represented a potentially significant moment of political 
socialization – thus involving “constitutive” rather than “ordinary” political rhetoric – the paper argues that it 
is consistent with a realistic model of rhetorical ethics to condemn this misconstrual as a violation of the trust 
reposed in democratic leadership.  
 
Résumé 
Cet essai réévalue la « crise de la coalition » survenue au Canada en 2008 à travers une analyse rhétorique des 
discours à la nation du Premier ministre Stephen Harper et du chef de l'opposition officielle, Stéphane Dion. 
En se concentrant en particulier sur les catégories rhétoriques classiques de l'éthos (auto-identification et 
positionnement du locuteur par rapport au public) et du logos (utilisation de la raison dans l'argumentation), 
il explore la manière dont Harper et Dion construisent des «principes de légitimité» divergents pour défendre 
leurs positions. Cet essai fait valoir que le discours de Dion a échoué, non seulement en raison des faibles 
valeurs de production qui dominaient les commentaires à l'époque, mais aussi en raison d'un appel inférieur 
à l'éthos marqué par une mauvaise gestion de l'icône rhétorique clé de la nation. Quant aux arguments  de 
fond  du discours de Harper, ils constituent une version trompeuse  des principes clés du gouvernement 
parlementaire. Puisque   la crise a représenté un moment potentiellement significatif de socialisation 
politique - impliquant ainsi une rhétorique politique «constitutive» plutôt qu’ «ordinaire» - l’essai soutient 
qu'il est possible,  dans le cadre d’un modèle réaliste d'éthique rhétorique, de dénoncer cette version 
trompeuse comme étant une violation de la confiance accordée  au leadership démocratique.  
 
Key words: Coalition crisis; Stephen Harper; rhetoric; rhetorical ethics; parliamentary government; Canadian 
politics 
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A little over 10 years ago, Canadian politics were convulsed by a brief but compelling 
“coalition crisis.”2 The recently-reelected Conservative government of Prime Minister 
Stephen Harper faced the threat of a vote of non-confidence by an opposition coalition, 
which argued that it could command the confidence of the House of Commons, and 
therefore govern, without recourse to a new election. After much heated rhetoric, including 
dueling nationally-televised speeches by the Prime Minister and Opposition leader 
Stéphane Dion, Harper successfully secured a prorogation of Parliament. Shortly thereafter, 
Dion was replaced as Liberal leader, and the proposed coalition collapsed. This paper offers 
a retrospective on these events through the medium of a rhetorical analysis of their fulcrum 
moment: the addresses to the nation by Prime Minister Harper and Leader of the 
Opposition Dion on the night of December 3, 2008.  
Political rhetoric in Canada receives only modest scholarly attention, at least when 
compared to the United States, and most of the energy in this respect has focused on the 
comparatively distant past.3 Yet these addresses represented perhaps the most charged 
rhetorical events in federal politics since the 1995 Quebec referendum, for the crisis 
“engaged Canadians politically at a level not matched since a decade or so [earlier] when 
the continuation of confederation was at issue” (Russell and Sossin 2009, xiii). While the 
speeches might be of some historical interest on these grounds, the subtler and perhaps 
deeper interest of these addresses resides in their status as potentially formative moments 
of political socialization, given the unusual fact that both leaders found themselves 
articulating foundational principles of the Canadian constitutional order. Loosely 
incorporating the traditional elements of rhetorical analysis – attending to the rhetorical 
context, argument, and effects (Martin 2014, 100-106) – I want to suggest that although the 
two speeches shared many thematic similarities, they differed strikingly on the degree and 
effectiveness with which they aligned their preferred position with Canadian nationhood 
itself. The Prime Minister unambiguously foregrounded Canadian identity; Dion declined 
(or failed) to do so. Herein lay one key to Harper’s rhetorical victory. But herein also lay a 
Faustian moment in that the price of victory was arguably a betrayal of the trust that ought 
to define democratic leadership.  
This paper explores the content of the two national addresses with a focus upon the 
leaders’ respective ethos appeals. Of particular interest is the manner in which they 
construct divergent “legitimacy principles” in defense of their preferred political positions, 
and how they tie these principles to specific conceptions of national identity and values. 
Harper’s speech achieves this by defining a particular view of democracy as constitutive of 
Canada. By contrast, Dion’s version is less persuasive in its evocation of national signifiers 
and frames its key legitimacy principle as older than, and therefore distinct from, Canada, 
while citing the practices of other countries in its defence. Dion’s error, then, goes beyond 
botched delivery (which, as we will see, drew widespread commentary). An inferior ethos 
appeal was embedded in the heart of his text. When we turn to the substance of the 
respective arguments, however – what rhetorical studies would call their “logos” – we 
discover that Harper’s address can be read as a misrepresentation of the Canadian 
constitutional order. Insofar as this is so, it cannot be excused with reference to political 
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exigencies, because a reasonably realistic view of political ethics may still demand that 
leaders uphold, rather than subvert, the institutional order with which they are entrusted.  
Toward a rhetorical analysis of the coalition crisis 
Being of recent vintage, the events in question require only a quick recap. The exceptionally 
“uncivil” election of October 14, 2008 saw the Conservatives win 143 seats, an increased 
plurality, but not a majority (Valpy 2009, 5). The Liberals remained the Official Opposition 
but suffered a drop from 103 to 77 seats, obliging Dion to announce his intention to step 
down as leader by May 2009. The sovereigntist Bloc Québécois under Gilles Duceppe and 
Jack Layton’s New Democratic Party claimed 49 and 37 seats respectively. While the 
parliamentary session began with a Throne Speech that won praise for its conciliatory tone 
(8), in a fiscal update on November 27, the Minister of Finance introduced “several poison 
pills” (Cameron 2009, 193), including the elimination of vote-based public subsidies to 
political parties and tough measures on civil service labour rights, with no promise of a 
major stimulus package to fight the recession which was erupting in the wake of the global 
financial crisis. In response, the Liberals and N.D.P. agreed to withdraw their confidence in 
the Conservatives and sought to form a coalition government, securing the Bloc’s promise 
to support the coalition for at least one year. They then informed the Governor General of 
their plans (Valpy 2009, 12-13). With a vote of non-confidence looming, the videotaped 
speeches of Harper and Dion were broadcast. On the morning of December 4, Harper 
received the Governor General’s permission to prorogue parliament until January 26, 2009. 
When parliament reconvened, Dion had been unseated as Liberal leader by Michael 
Ignatieff, who – having extracted substantial concessions from the Conservatives (including 
the retention of party subsidies and the introduction of a large stimulus package) – 
abandoned the coalition and directed his party to vote its confidence in the government. 
Thus ended the “coalition crisis” (Valpy 2009). 
The speeches of December 3 were, of course, hardly the only factor in this outcome. 
Both sides had been furiously “messaging” their positions in the days prior, and continued 
to do so in subsequent days and weeks. Communications efforts ran the gamut from 
speeches and debates in the House of Commons to press conferences and impassioned 
media appearances by relevant players from all parties (Wells 2013, 210-225). Still, the 
televised addresses marked a quiet triumph for Harper and an extraordinary disaster for 
Dion. The latter’s Chief of Staff, Johanne Senekal, publicly apologized the following day for 
the poor quality of Dion’s video presentation (Visser 2008). Within two days, Dion had 
been supplanted as principal party spokesman by internal rivals (Taber 2008), and five 
days thereafter he was replaced for good by Ignatieff. Commentary on Dion’s speech 
focused overwhelmingly on its unprofessional presentation. As The Globe and Mail’s Jane 
Taber observed, “Mr. Dion and his team couldn't even get his televised national address - a 
speech intended to counter Mr. Harper's appeal - to TV networks on time. The production 
values of the tape were also poor, with Mr. Dion out of focus at times. It appeared his head 
was emerging from the shelf behind him” (2008). A Maclean’s magazine summation of the 
affair devoted two paragraphs to the content of Harper’s speech while saying nothing about 
Dion’s arguments, focusing purely on the lateness and inept production quality of his 
performance (Geddes and Wherry 2008). So bizarre was the situation that even the remote 
New York Times observed: “Bad Video Overshadows Politician’s Message” (Austen 2008). 
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Less noticed in all of this was that in its marshalling of the “available means of persuasion” 
(Aristotle 2004, 6) as well as in delivery, Harper’s rhetoric was much superior to Dion’s. 
Indeed, this may have contributed to the ease with which commentators passed over the 
content of the latter to dwell on its inept delivery. The following section pursues this 
thought, suggesting that it is primarily in the category of ethos appeal that the speeches 
diverge in rhetorical power. Ethos is, of course, part of the classic trinity of rhetorical 
appeals, the others being logos (the use of reason) and pathos (the stirring of the 
emotions). Classically, ethos refers to the “personal character of the speaker” (Aristotle 
2004, 6), but the concept may be extended to include such factors as self-positioning as an 
“agent” of legitimate authority, evocation of shared identity within an audience and 
identification between speaker and audience, and strategies of polarization which divide 
audience and speaker from selected “out-groups” (see Crick 2011, 130-145). Harper’s 
ethos appeal was built upon an overwhelming focus upon Canadian identity, fusing 
nationhood with a specific reading of democracy, and thereby assuming the persona of an 
agent speaking for, and defending, the nation’s defining values. Dion – surprisingly – did 
almost the opposite.   
Some of the most powerful tropes a modern orator can deploy derive from the themes 
of nationhood and national identity, offering a vision of “imagined community” binding 
strangers together across a vast, bounded territory, rooted in time and extending into the 
indefinite future (e.g., Anderson 1991; Billig 1995). Thus – to take some notable examples – 
“almost every speech [Ronald] Reagan gave, especially on memorable occasions, was an 
evocation of what America had been and could be again” (Lim 2008, 61). Martin Luther 
King’s “I Have a Dream” speech works equally from a vision of justice and from an explicitly 
national vision: “a dream…deeply rooted in the American dream” (King 1963). Part of what 
makes the speech so iconic is just this appeal to a wider national solidarity (Hansen 2005). 
A similar principle holds true of Barack Obama’s most soaring moments (“there's not a 
liberal America and a conservative America; there's the United States of America” [Obama 
2004]). Nor is this a uniquely American phenomenon. Here is Pierre Trudeau in the 
peroration of the most important speech of his career: 
We won't let this country die, this Canada, our home and native land, this 
Canada which really is, as our national anthem says, our home and native land. 
We are going to say to those who want us to stop being Canadians, we are going 
to say a resounding, an overwhelming NO (Trudeau 1980). 
The claim is not that nationhood is some all-purpose oratorical trump card. It’s simply 
that Lincoln’s “mystic chords of memory” reflect an obvious and powerful rhetorical icon 
which, skilfully deployed, reliably moves an audience. Similarly, democracy enjoys a 
privileged status as a central, defining good for moderns (e.g., Dunn 2006). In a duel of 
speeches over a national political crisis, one would expect the orators to make full use of 
such icons, and the adroitness of this usage to be a major marker of success or failure. 
A Tale of Two Speeches: The National Addresses of 2008  
When we examine the content of the 2008 speeches, we find that Dion fails, not simply 
because of the production values to which standard accounts rightly give so much 
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attention, but because he declines to make effective use of these two dominant rhetorical 
icons of the modern world. By contrast, not only does Harper make use of these symbols, 
but he fuses them into a single two-sided rhetorical icon – a compelling device, provided 
we accept his premises. Dion’s neglect of these elements is especially baffling given that the 
heated parliamentary debates of December 1-3 had centred on questions of democracy and 
nationhood, with imprecations (and sometimes direct accusations) of treason hurled 
across the aisle.4 Dion responded furiously to these charges. He must have understood, 
then, that nationhood was going to be a battleground in the televised addresses. Yet despite 
having “agonized so long over his text that…video technicians had little time to set up a 
proper shot and no time to fix mistakes” (Geddes and Wherry 2008), his handling of these 
themes was remarkably maladroit.  
The nationhood/democracy axis is indeed the key, for the speeches are thematically 
nearly twins, each consisting almost wholly of the following themes:  
(1) an acknowledgement of the gravity of the economic crisis and a litany of measures for 
dealing with it. A subsidiary point concerns collaboration: both speakers claim to be 
working in a way that transcends partisanship, reaching out to other parties and interests 
in their efforts to meet the crisis. 
(2) a legitimacy principle, according to which the speaker, and not their opponent, is 
entitled to be prime minister of Canada. This is the crucial point of demarcation between 
the addresses, and it is above all on this front that Harper’s rhetorical strategy outclasses 
that of his opponent. 
(3) a program of action for defending that legitimacy principle, against the illegitimate 
strivings of their opponent. 
Let us take these in order. In itemizing his government’s economic actions and 
supposedly collaborative spirit – a litany which includes tax reductions, “doubling spending 
on infrastructure,” an Automotive Innovation Fund, “increasing support and incentives” in 
various sectors, and so forth, all undertaken while “consulting widely with Canadians” – 
Harper’s primary aim is surely defensive: to neutralize the predictable opposition charge 
that his government has done nothing to address the emerging recession (2008b). Dion 
gives a longer litany of economic actions which his coalition will undertake, such as 
“gather[ing] with leaders of industry and labour to work, unlike the Conservatives, in a 
collaborative but urgent manner to protect jobs,” “invest[ing] significantly more” in 
infrastructure, and stimulating the economy through “green” investments (2008c). That the 
litany is not as precise as Harper’s, and differs in its content, probably matters less to its 
rhetorical effect than the fact that Harper, speaking first, anticipated and pre-empted its 
gist. This leaves Dion’s audience in the position of sitting through a second lengthy list of 
proposals for economic action, and perhaps gives his litany a redundant air. Still, economic 
action and collaboration remain, for Harper, “shield” issues (Wells 2013, 109), designed 
mainly to deflect an obvious avenue of opposition attack.  
On theme (2), the legitimacy principle, Harper draws a sword. He begins by declaring 
that “Canadians take pride in our history as one of the world’s oldest continuous 
democracies. During the past 141 years, political parties have emerged and disappeared, 
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leaders have come and gone, and governments have changed. Constant in every case, 
however, is the principle that Canada’s Government has always been chosen by the people” 
(2008b).  
Note two things here. One is Harper’s self-positioning as a non-partisan “agent” of 
Canadian democracy: he adopts a trans-generational perspective, rising above day-to-day 
partisan travails, to affirm the key principle. This is a strong ethos move, since his case 
relies precisely upon the reliability of his interpretation of that precept, for which a 
statesmanlike self-positioning is vital. The second, more important point is that he defines 
national pride in terms of history, and national history in terms of a particular reading of 
democracy. Harper welds the two icons – nationhood and democracy – together from the 
start.  
He thus implies that our democratic heritage is more than a source of pride in its own 
right, because many other cherished aspects of national identity grow out of it. “Following 
in the light of this democratic tradition, Canadians have built one of the most peaceful and 
prosperous countries the world has ever known – a land of hope and opportunity that 
inspires others around the globe, and has drawn millions as new immigrants to our 
country” (2008b). Peace, prosperity, hope, opportunity, immigration and, by implication, 
multicultural diversity – all somehow follow from the principle of “democracy” sketched 
above. Some of these symbols, such as hope and prosperity, are straightforwardly 
universal, while others assume a distinctively nationalist inflection in Canadian discourse 
(think of peace-keeping and multiculturalism as markers of Canadian national identity). 
Harper’s use of these thus reinforces his imbrication in national values and an identity 
shared in common with his audience.   
To the extent that he defines “democracy,” meanwhile, it is purely in electoral, 
rather than parliamentary, terms. Governments are “chosen by the people,” meaning, 
presumably, that the most votes, or perhaps seats, wins. Of course, this seems to deny the 
principle of responsible government according to which governments rule by virtue of the 
confidence of the House of Commons. Jennifer Smith excoriates Harper’s stance as a “faux-
populist” denial of core principles of the parliamentary system (2009), a discomfort shared 
by – among others – David Cameron (2009, 190-91), Grace Skogstad (2009, 170), Graham 
White (2009, 158), Peter Russell (2009, 141-142), Lawrence LeDuc (2009, 132), Jean 
Leclair and Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens (2009, 106), Lorraine Weinrib (2009), 
Andrew Heard (2009, 53-55), C.E.S. Franks (2009), Gary Levy (2009, 26-28), and Peter 
Aucoin, Mark Jarvis, and Lori Turnbull (2011, 155-201). 
Presumably unperturbed by the thought of drawing fire from legions of constitutional 
experts, Harper proceeds to frame his own government as the extension of this principle 
(“we are honoured that you returned our government to office”). It is at this point that he 
provides his litany of economic actions being undertaken by this duly elected government, 
which is “consulting widely with Canadians,” including premiers, international actors, and 
the opposition. His claims to reasonableness and collegiality suitably reinforced, Harper 
returns to the legitimacy principle, this time drawing blood: 
Unfortunately, even before the Government has brought forward its budget, and 
only seven weeks after a general election, the opposition wants to overturn the 
results of that election…the Opposition does not have the democratic right to 
impose a coalition with the separatists which they promised voters would never 
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happen. The Opposition is imposing the coalition deal without your say, without 
your consent, and without your vote (2008b, italics added). 
Democracy and nationhood having been fused, and the former having been defined in 
purely “electoral” terms, we see how sharply Harper has honed his point. Nothing less than 
Canada’s essence, its defining existential principle, is at stake. The coalition is illegitimate 
because the Conservatives were “chosen by the people” to govern. Compounding this is 
that the Liberals and N.D.P. did not explicitly run on a coalition platform (an untenable 
demand, of course, as “coalition formation practices globally depend on the outcome of 
elections to determine how to best align parties” and therefore cannot be determined in 
advance (Bonga 2010, 11).  Indeed, national unity itself is at risk: the opposition is 
“entering into a power-sharing coalition with a separatist party.” While the Bloc was not 
part of the “power-sharing” coalition per se – its agreement not to vote against the coalition 
on matters of confidence was a legislative, rather than executive, form of coalition (Bonga 
2010, 9) – Harper’s invocation of unity is of a piece with his sharp rhetorical emphasis on 
nationhood. 
So serious does all of this seem that, when Harper reaches theme (3), his plan of action 
for defending his legitimacy principle, it sounds less hyperbolic than reasonable. “This is a 
pivotal moment in our history. We Canadians are the inheritors of a great legacy” – framed 
in terms of the “democracy” defined above – “and it is our duty to protect it for the 
generations still to come. Tonight, I pledge to you that Canada’s government will use every 
legal means at our disposal to protect our democracy, to protect our economy, and to 
protect Canada” (2008b).5 
The triadic anaphora of the final sentence, and the harmony between his introduction 
(“our history”) and conclusion (“our legacy…for future generations”), show a discreetly deft 
hand. But what really counts is that, having positioned himself as an agent speaking on 
behalf of the nationhood/democracy icon, he can now plausibly cast himself as its 
champion, facing down an existential threat. 
How, by comparison, does Stéphane Dion proceed? We have already noted that his 
address was marred from the beginning by substandard production values. Recall too, that 
his speech contains his version of theme (1), a litany of economic actions which the 
coalition promises to undertake. But theme (2), the legitimacy principle, is the rock on 
which Dion’s effort was bound to stand or fall. As it happens, it falls – and spectacularly so. 
In the first place, where Harper’s speech constructed rhetorical arrows all pointing 
toward the startling claim that “the opposition wants to overturn the results of the 
election,” Dion buries his principle of legitimacy within something of a rhetorical slough. 
The third paragraph of his text declares that “the Harper Conservatives have lost the 
confidence of the majority of members of the House of Commons. In our democracy, in our 
parliamentary system, in our Constitution, this means they have lost the right to govern” 
(2008c). This is a crucial and admirably clear distillation of a legitimacy principle. But it lies 
smothered between a sequence of quotidian complaints about the prime minister’s bull-
headedness (“Stephen Harper still refuses to propose measures to stimulate the Canadian 
economy…his priority is partisanship and settling scores”), and the mundane observation 
that “Canadians don’t want another election.” The latter point – besides being humdrum – 
elides the principle of parliamentary supremacy, which Dion needs above all to defend, 
with the populist or electoral view of democracy, which he needs to neutralize. If what is at 
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stake is merely what Canadians “want” at any given moment, then parliament is a 
secondary, not primary, concern. But probably more damaging to the rhetorical effect is the 
muffling of the explosive charge that Harper “has lost the right to govern.” Complaints 
about Harper’s intransigence, and public hostility to another election, distract from Dion’s 
most piquant argument – that the government is illegitimate – and prevent him from 
isolating and rarifying his core principle in a fashion to rival Harper’s. 
“In our democracy, in our parliamentary system, in our Constitution:” stylistically, 
Dion’s triad should work. But it introduces a subtle ambiguity: who is the “we’ to which this 
refers? Canada, clearly; but it could also refer to the coalition (as in, “this is our 
understanding of the constitution”) – i.e., specific partisan actors within Canada, rather 
than Canada itself, of which Harper had unambiguously presented himself as defender. This 
also seems an oddly missed opportunity to deliver a rising tricolon and to ring three times 
on the rhetorical chord “Canada” (e.g., “in Canada’s system, in Canada’s democracy,” etc.). In 
declining the chance to burnish the speaker’s credentials as a non-partisan representative 
of that icon, the passage prefigures the text’s most serious flaw. 
“Our system of government was not born with Canada. It is ancient. There are rules that 
govern it and conventions that guide it” (2008c). This is the heart of Dion’s address: the 
decisive defence and elaboration of his legitimacy principle. And at this pivotal point, Dion 
widens the gulf between that principle and “Canada” as a freestanding rhetorical icon. The 
principle in question “was not born with Canada;” this creates a distinction between the 
two, precisely where Harper had fused them. This gap yawns still further when Dion 
proceeds to cite foreign authorities in an attempt to normalize the coalition. “Coalitions are 
normal and current practice in many parts of the world and are able to work very 
successfully.” Dion thereby reinforces the otherness of the principles guiding coalitions, 
and their foreignness as a form of government: “not born with Canada,” “normal in many 
[other] parts of the world” (2008c). This would be unlikely to resonate with an audience 
not well-schooled in parliamentary tradition – especially one primed by Harper’s speech to 
think in terms of Canadian nationhood and identity. A strong awareness of the rhetorical 
power of national identity would rule out constructing the case in this way. Far more 
effective, one suspects, would have been accusing Stephen Harper of appealing to the 
American principle of direct presidential election, in contradistinction to Canada’s 
parliamentary model. 
Having inverted Harper’s approach by severing his legitimacy principle from Canada 
per se, Dion then tries to heal the breach. Coalition governments work “with simple 
ingredients: consensus, goodwill, and cooperation. Consensus is a great Canadian 
value…[and] our coalition is a consensus [sic] to govern with a well-defined program to 
address the most important issue facing the country: the economy” (2008c, italics added).  
“Consensus,” though, is an eccentric choice for national icon in a liberal democracy. No 
Canadian ever went to war, fought and died, for “consensus.” Nor is consensus listed in any 
standard account of Canadian values or markers of identity, such as liberalism, democracy, 
multiculturalism, peacekeeping, military heroism, or nordicity (see, for example, Nieguth 
and Raney 2017).  This move thus scores at best a glancing blow against Harper’s emphasis 
on democracy and marks a peculiarly limp corrective to Dion’s own earlier portrayal of his 
legitimacy principle as somehow distinct from, or transcendent to, that which is properly 
“Canadian.” 
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With the first movement of his address, Dion has, in effect if surely not in intention, 
ceded the terrain of nationhood to his opponent. Harper’s twinned his legitimacy principle 
unambiguously to Canada, portraying it as Canada’s very essence. Dion, by contrast, avoids 
naming the national icon at the key moment, and defines his principle of legitimacy as 
something “beyond” Canada, older than it, and foreign to it. 
In the speech’s brief peroration, Dion reinforces the mistake. “If Mr. Harper wants to 
suspend parliament he must first face a vote of confidence. In our Canada, the government 
is accountable for its decisions and actions in Parliament. In our Canada, the government 
derives its legitimacy from an elected parliament” (2008c). The latter sentences have the 
merit of at least mentioning Canada by name; but who, again, is the “we” to which this “our” 
refers? This passage immediately follows an extended discussion of “our coalition” and the 
actions “we” – clearly meaning the coalition – will take: 
To stimulate the economy and create good well-paid jobs we [i.e., the coalition] 
will…invest significantly more in our country’s infrastructure…we can stimulate 
our economy through investments in clean energy, water and our gateways…we 
believe it is imperative that the government offers Canadians who have already 
lost their job…the support they need to live in dignity and develop new 
skills. This is precisely what we intend to provide (2008c). 
Not only does this textual positioning of the “in our Canadas” above make Dion sound 
as though he is speaking as an agent of the coalition rather than Canada as such, but it also 
ramifies for the earlier part of the address, serving to deepen the ambiguity about whom he 
had in mind when he claimed to be speaking for “our” democracy, parliamentary system, 
and constitution. The upshot is that, where Stephen Harper positioned himself as an agent 
of Canada and its defining values, Dion, in the passages which grapple most directly with 
the principle of legitimacy that crucially differentiates his address from Harper’s, fails to do 
so.  
As for theme (3), the “program of action,” Dion’s project affords a more complex 
rhetorical problem than Harper’s. Recall that Harper vowed to pursue “every legal means” 
against a coalition which he had defined as illegitimate. Dion, by contrast, must promise 
two things. One is to implement the economic activism outlined in his address. He does this 
by vowing “to work day and night to combat this economic crisis, to do what it takes to 
minimize its effects on the economy, to protect jobs and to create jobs” (2008c). The other 
is to reiterate his commitment, made well before the “coalition crisis,” to resign from the 
Liberal leadership, and thus from his desired role as prime minister steering the coalition, 
within six months of assuming office. 
Beyond establishing the speakers as bona fide representatives of nationhood, part of 
the ethos challenge in these speeches is seeming “prime-ministerial” – not a problem for 
Harper, given his established occupancy of the office, but a major issue for Dion, whose 
credibility had been badly damaged by poor election results. He addresses the problem 
through a coda, a “personal note” acknowledging his commitment to surrender the 
leadership and vowing to “work day and night” in the time remaining (2008c). Tacitly 
affirming his impending departure, but not the legitimacy of his claim to office in the 
interim, Dion imparts the ambivalent message: I am the legitimate prime minister, but I 
understand that I’m not popular, and will only serve in the office for a short period. This 
Gregory Millard     63   
 
 
combination of humility and self-legitimization, arguably enhanced by his awkward, 
diffident delivery, is probably the best that could be wished for from a speaker in Dion’s 
position. But he is playing a bad hand, and it is insufficient to redeem his fundamental 
rhetorical mistake of neglecting to explicitly foreground nationhood. 
Given nationhood’s status as an especially potent rhetorical icon, then, Dion’s speech 
would have been unlikely to resonate even with exemplary production values and delivery. 
The lesson is obvious: in a time of national political crisis, do not leave out, subordinate, or 
misunderstand the power of nationalism. His was in every respect an inferior effort – save, 
perhaps, on one dimension: that of logos, i.e., argumentative substance. The following 
section considers the implications of this point. 
Rhetorical Ethics and Stephen Harper’s “Legitimacy Principle” 
What, then, are the rhetorical responsibilities of democratic leaders in such a moment? 
This vast question can be brought under tighter control by focusing on two more modest 
variants: 
i. Was it legitimate of Harper to deploy “the separatists” as the enemy who 
must not be worked with? 
ii. What are the normative implications of Harper’s decision to represent the 
“legitimacy principle” as he did? 
Although it generated considerable controversy at the time, the first question need not 
delay us for long. One of the obvious dangers in invoking national identity is exclusion. The 
assertion of a national “essence” necessarily makes “others” of those who fail to partake of 
it; defining the national in-group implies an out-group, and it is all too easy to slip into 
marginalizing or degrading the latter. These dangers are compounded when a targeted out-
group is in a position to destabilize the polity, as has long been the case with Quebec 
nationalists. Conservative rhetoric during the “coalition crisis” effectively targeted two 
related out-group participants: first and foremost, “the separatists,” and secondly, those 
who would collaborate with them in the Coalition, who were accused of a “plot to destroy 
the country.” Harper built on these threads in his address, along with the insinuation that 
Dion was abrogating Canadian democracy (since “Canada’s government has always been 
chosen by the people” [2008b]).  
According to Patricia Roberts-Miller (2005, 459) “a basic principle of democracy is that 
the ability of the general public to make appropriate decisions depends to a large degree on 
the quality of public discourse.” In elaborating on this, she argues that demagoguery – i.e., 
that which is morally inadmissible in democratic debate – entails “polarizing propaganda 
[defined as ‘highly fallacious discourse’ (466)] that motivates members of an in-group to 
hate and scapegoat some outgroup(s), largely by promising certainty, stability, and what 
Erich Fromm famously called ‘an escape from freedom’ through the simplification of 
complex issues” (462). “Hate” and “scapegoating” are strong words; too strong, indeed, to 
be applicable to Harper’s address. It is true that insofar as the Conservative discourse 
accused opponents of something much like treason, it drew close to an alarmism apt to 
trigger, and justify, extreme responses. Such hyper-polarization artificially intensifies the 
stakes of partisan conflict, making the losers less likely to accept losing (since the survival 
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of the nation itself is imagined to be in play), and more likely to make and support choices 
that put constitutional and legal norms at risk. Absent strong evidence of the validity of the 
charge of treason, then, democratic leaders ought to avoid it. Mercifully, Harper’s speech (if 
not wider Conservative discourse) stopped short of such an accusation; at most it implied 
it. Still, Harper’s stance attracted considerable hand-wringing that casting the “separatists” 
beyond the pale would stoke the fires of the sovereignty movement (e.g., Franks 2009, 40; 
Cameron 2009, 190; Mason 2008; Seguin 2008). 
We should note two facts right away. First, there is a long tradition of “othering” 
separatists in Canadian politics. Pierre Trudeau, indeed, justified imposing the 1982 
Constitution Act upon Quebec on the grounds that Quebec’s sovereigntist government 
would never negotiate in good faith, such that its consent was unnecessary. He continued 
to inveigh against “separatists” well into his remarkably disruptive retirement (Trudeau 
1988). Second, sovereigntists themselves routinely position Canada as the “other” against 
which their project and national identity are defined.  I have suggested elsewhere that 
“othering” an out-group becomes increasingly excusable to the extent that the in-group is 
powerless (Millard 2009). Yet – notwithstanding the assertions of sovereigntists – it is far 
from clear that there is a self-evidently massive imbalance of power between Ottawa and 
Quebec, such that this “othering” by sovereigntists could be excused as a compensatory 
response to the powerlessness of their preferred “in-group,” the Québécois (Millard 2009, 
333). Harper’s speech did not reject the basic legitimacy of the sovereignty movement or 
the Bloc Québécois, but merely denied that they are legitimate partners for collaboration 
with a governing coalition. Formally speaking, the denial is absurd; since the Bloc voted in 
favour of some bills passed by his own minority government, it too effectively governed 
with the support of the Bloc, albeit on an ad-hoc basis (but see Bliss 2008). And the Harper 
Conservatives themselves had been prepared to undertake a governing coalition with the 
possible support of the Bloc in 2004 (Boswell 2011). Nonetheless, a condemnation of 
formal, ongoing agreements with “the separatists” seems a reasonable (if intemperate) 
move for a democratic leader to make. Harper’s tactic here was closer to rudeness than to 
illegitimate demagoguery. 
Much more troubling was Harper’s definition of Canadian democracy. We saw above 
that a formidable array of authorities on parliament and the Canadian constitution, while 
diverging on the merits of the coalition, or on how the Governor General should fulfill her 
responsibilities, rejected Harper’s definition, repudiating it as a negation of the 
fundamental principles of the Canadian order. “In constitutional terms, Harper’s claim that 
he, not the Liberals, had received a mandate to govern was nonsense” (Franks 2009, 39). As 
Peter H. Russell puts it, 
Harper offered his own rules of government…the primary rule [being that] 
parliamentary elections result in the election of a prime minister. And the 
second rule, a corollary of the first, is that the prime minister cannot be changed 
without another election being called…[and] a third rule [is] that a coalition 
government cannot be formed unless it is acknowledged as a possibility in the 
election campaign and (applying his first rule) the leader of the coalition party 
who is to be prime minister wins the most seats (2009, 141). 




Harper’s rules are not consistent with well-established practices of our system of 
parliamentary government…If Harper is interested in [combining a 
parliamentary system with a directly elected prime minister] he should go 
about building support for the appropriate constitutional amendments. In the 
meantime, he should not mislead Canadians into believing that Canada already 
has a system of directly electing its prime minister (Russell 2009, 141-2, italics 
added). 
Russell concludes by noting that “the vigorous propagation of Harper’s rules may 
already have had a major impact on the public’s understanding of the Canadian 
constitution. On December 15 2008, an Ipsos Reid poll reported that 51 per cent of 
Canadians believe that the prime minister of Canada is directly elected” (2009, 142). 
In a related vein, Aucoin et al. observe that “if the principle that a government can gain 
the legitimacy to govern only through elections is to be truly meaningful, a number of other 
fundamental departures from traditional and current practices ought to follow” (2011, 
185). This “populist” or “elections-only” position holds that voters are not voting for MPs 
but rather for parties, and that this vote is primarily an expression of which party we wish 
to see in government. Thus, if I vote for a Liberal candidate, I want a Liberal government, 
full stop. By this measure, it must be democratically illegitimate for an MP to cross the floor 
and join another party, or to vote against her own party. Most tellingly, it must be 
democratically illegitimate for an opposition party to side with the government on any 
confidence measure. Thus, “the MPs of other parties who were supporting a minority 
government” – as happened from 2006-2011 under Harper – “would be ignoring the 
voters’ electoral choices” (186) and thereby violating this principle of democratic 
legitimacy. In short, the logic of this model effectively precludes any functioning minority 
parliament. Barring further reforms (187), then, the premises of the “populist” position are 
revealed to be ultimately incompatible with foundational established practices of Canadian 
parliamentary democracy.6  
Now the most robustly-developed repudiation of such arguments has come from 
Rainer Knopff and Dave Snow (2013). Their case is telling. They show, contra Aucoin et al., 
that scholars and commentators such as Tom Flanagan (2009), Michael Bliss (2008), and 
Andrew Potter (2009), who rejected the defensibility of the coalition’s position, did not in 
fact adhere to an “elections-only” theory of democratic legitimacy (Knopff and Snow 2013, 
23). Instead, they denied that the coalition met the necessary criteria for replacing a 
government between elections – owing especially to its reliance upon the support of 
“separatists,” and also on the fact that the coalition partners had stated while campaigning 
that they had no interest in a coalition government (21-22). This latter point risks 
ultimately collapsing back into the populist “elections-only” theory inasmuch as it deprives 
MPs of the right to change their minds in light of subsequent events, and so defaults to 
elections as the sole measure of legitimacy. But of greater interest here is what Knopff and 
Snow say about Harper himself: “did he seriously intend [a constitutionally untenable] 
elections-only view in 2008? Perhaps. But if he did, he was clearly departing from previous 
support for the older constitutional consensus, as his critics consistently emphasize. 
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Moreover, if he was in 2008 contradicting his earlier views, he did not maintain his ‘new 
rules’ position very long, as his critics are less apt to observe” (23-4). 
They go on to suggest that several statements by Harper from 2009-2011 tacitly 
repudiate an “elections-only” position (24). This paper, however, is concerned with his 
most important and formal public statement on the matter, the nationally-televised 
address of December 3 2008. And as we have seen, the lynchpin of that statement was 
precisely the “elections-only” position – in violation of “the older constitutional consensus” 
which Harper himself, according to Knopff and Snow, supported on other occasions. 
So, if we proceed with our rhetorical inquiry informed by this “parliamentary” critique 
of Harper, the principal question becomes: to what degree is it condemnable for a prime 
minister to miscast Canada’s foundational constitutional principles in an important 
national address? We can imagine a continuum of responses to this question, ranging from 
the ultra-permissive to the ultra-restrictive. At the former pole, success is the sole measure 
of validity. This would be the discursive equivalent of Thrasymachus’s position in The 
Republic (justice as “the interest of the stronger”). When John Ibbitson brusquely writes 
that “coalitions are legitimate if [people think they are] legitimate” (2015, 288), he does not 
go quite this far – rather he adheres to a straightforwardly majoritarian principle; but we 
see how untenable that principle is when we contemplate the possibility of majority 
enthusiasm for demagoguery in Roberts-Miller’s sense. 
Less extravagant, but still on the permissive end of the spectrum, would be a discursive 
application of the “dirty hands” thesis made famous by Michael Walzer (1973). On this 
“means-ends” view, violating important discursive norms would be defensible if it prevents 
a worse evil, such as the ascension to power of an incompetent coalition government 
propped up by “the separatists.” A practical problem with “dirty hands” arguments in 
general is that once carried into the hyper-competitive world of partisan politics, they tend 
to collapse back into permitting almost anything. Rare is the politician who, locked in a 
dog-eat-dog battle with his foes, does not believe that the triumph of his opponent would 
be other than a disaster. The means-ends calculus thus lends itself to unhealthy extremes. 
Furthermore, the application of the argument in this context presumes a certain knowledge 
of future consequences which, except under rare circumstances, exceeds the remit of 
human agents. A Liberal activist might tell herself that a Conservative victory means a 
“hidden agenda” against women’s rights which must be stopped at nearly any cost – but 
hers would be a highly questionable presumption. Thus the “separatist” bugbear 
mentioned above, with its implication that a “coalition with separatists” would leave the 
country in jeopardy, cannot justify overthrowing important normative guardrails. Not only 
was the Bloc Québécois not formally part of the governing coalition, but, pace Bliss (2008), 
much more developed analysis would be required to show that that coalition posed any 
kind of direct threat to national unity.  
At the opposite end of these “permissive” views of the ethics of democratic discourse 
lies a “political moralism,” which strives for “the application of independently derived 
moral standards to the making of political decisions” (Yack 2006, 419). At their most 
crystalline, these manifest as a Kantian insistence upon a high-minded moral purity and 
unrelenting truth-telling: “let justice be done though the world may perish” (see Arendt 
2000, 546). Leaders, on this view, owe us upright behaviour, rigorous integrity, and 
unflinching honesty. We perhaps see shades of this position in the “WikiLeaks” discourse, 
with its denial that states are entitled to keep secrets, or the denunciations of politicians 
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who reproduce questionable yet well-established institutional practices (think of Hillary 
Clinton’s e-mails). The trouble with the high-minded stance is that democratic politicians 
are inescapably implicated in what Ruth Grant calls “necessary hypocrisy,” working as they 
do in “processes [which] are structured so as to increase the dependencies conducive to 
hypocritical behavior” (2015, 176). Democratic politicians’ “skill of constructing a position 
which will appeal to many people because it can harmonize conflicting desires” is often 
condemned for “vagueness and indeterminacy,” or indeed as “support-seeking duplicity,” 
even when it has more in common with “tact” (Minogue 2005, 65). Echoing such 
considerations, Bernard Williams contrasts political moralism with “political realism,” 
according to which “political theory should shape its account of itself more realistically to 
what is platitudinously politics” (2005, 13); and Yack places Aristotelean rhetoric, with its 
cynical-seeming commitment to “the available means of persuasion,” within this context 
(2006, 418).    
So almost as important as avoiding an anything-goes “Thrasymachus” position is 
disavowing a prim distaste for the hurly-burly of partisan democratic discourse, in the 
name of, say, some allegiance to a demanding model of “deliberative democracy,” or 
something along the lines of Elvin Lim’s seminal call for a “pedagogical presidency” (2008). 
Such constructs may offer valuable critical purchase upon the discursive dynamics of 
actually existing representative democracies. The trouble lies in invoking their ideal 
criteria without thereby committing to a systematic critique of those democracies – a 
problem illustrated by chapter three of Lim’s book, which models the political benefits of 
“going anti-intellectual,” and concludes that rational politicians would “believe that, even if 
both parties go anti-intellectual, their individual gains will be more than if both choose not 
to go anti-intellectual” (50). The unfortunate implication is that Lim’s prescription – 
pedagogical leadership committed to sober explication of public policy – is self-defeating. 
Any realistic theory of rhetorical ethics in existing representative democracies, or more 
precisely, a theory which could reasonably be adhered to by partisan actors in the 
extremely competitive situations in which they presently find themselves – needs to leave 
room for the sorts of simplifications, elisions, abeyances, misrepresentations, and 
“sustained dissimulation” in which almost all politicians are forced to engage, at least some 
of the time (Kane and Patapan 2012, 90). If Grant (2015) is right, such behaviours may still 
be compatible with – they may even, paradoxically, be an inescapable component of – the 
most fundamental obligations entrusted to democratic leaders. 
The problem, then, is this. Stephen Harper was not engaging in such routine democratic 
politicking when he misrepresented our basic constitutional order in a national address. He 
was not, for instance, overseeing a crass “attack ad” caricaturing his opponent, or flippantly 
reducing an opponent’s policy position to a misleading slogan (e.g., a carbon tax is a “tax on 
everything”), or brazenly abandoning campaign promises (e.g., Justin Trudeau’s 2016 flip-
flop on electoral reform), or prevaricating deviously in order to dodge awkward questions 
(Bill Clinton: “it depends what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is”). Such stuff may be the 
necessary if unappetizing gruel of partisan life. But in a context of significant 
“constitutional illiteracy,” where few citizens understand even the most basic precepts of 
their own constitutional and political order (Russell 2016), Stephen Harper – formally 
addressing the nation as prime minister during a “pivotal moment in our history” – was 
positioned to play at least a modestly “constitutive” role in reproducing or undermining 
that order, reinforcing or undercutting its value in the minds of citizens, whose allegiance 
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to it is its only ultimate guarantor. Otherwise put, he was in a privileged, and therefore 
particularly responsible, position. It is compatible with a “realistic” view of the 
responsibilities of democratic leadership to insist that leaders are under an obligation not 
to actively undermine the constitutional order. This injunction precludes the deliberate 
distortion of its most basic precepts, especially when most of their audience is ignorant of 
those precepts. Thus, there is a difference between the “necessary hypocrisy” permissible 
to democratic leaders, as with (say) dissimulation on a question of public policy, and 
dissimulation of the sort that corrodes the very system to which those leaders owe their 
authority.  
There must be, then, a morally salient difference between “ordinary” and “constitutive” 
political rhetoric. The latter concerns basic principles of legitimacy, where these are 
directly at issue; clear examples might be The Federalist Papers or Canada’s public debates 
around the Charlottetown Accord in 1992 (Noël 1994). “Ordinary” political rhetoric refers 
to debates unfolding within those established, constitutive principles – i.e., the day-to-day 
stuff of political controversy. If the lines between these can easily blur (and one could insist 
that all political rhetoric is in some sense “constitutive”), the distinction is still worth 
making; and the closer their rhetoric comes to “constitutive,” the graver is the duty of our 
leaders to abide by, rather than corrode, the foundations of the political order with which 
they have been entrusted. 
Prime ministers take an oath to “truly and faithfully, and to the best of my skill and 
knowledge, execute the powers and trust reposed in me as Prime Minister of Canada” 
(Governor General of Canada). An element of that “trust” must be to uphold and sustain the 
constitutional order in which the office is embedded, which includes working to sustain the 
political-cultural foundations of that order.7 If this is correct, and if the “parliamentary” 
reading of the constitutional issues at stake is also correct, then by misrepresenting the 
principle of responsible government, Stephen Harper’s address of December 3 violated the 
fundamental terms of his trust as a democratic leader.  
Obviously, it cannot be beyond the pale to work openly to change that constitutional 
order. If this were so, then the labours of past prime ministers for constitutional reform 
would also have been violations of trust. The key is to be up-front about it. If a prime 
minister seeks to change the foundations of the system, she has a robust duty to be explicit 
about this, rather than proceed by stealth, subterfuge, and the misrepresentation of the 
nature of that order. The pursuit of formally-entrenched constitutional change by Harper’s 
predecessors tended to proceed as if this were obviously so: Sir John A. Macdonald and the 
other Fathers of Confederation held widely-publicized conferences, “remarkably inclusive 
in their political composition” (Russell 2017, 132) at which the possibility of a union of the 
British North American colonies was a clear and explicit aim; Pierre Trudeau spent almost 
two decades publicly arguing for his preferred vision of constitutional change, helping to 
make such change a central dimension of Canadian public discourse over that span (but see 
Laforest 1995, 15-37); and Brian Mulroney, similarly, was if anything even more forthright 
about his constitutional intentions. Even the Chrétien government’s most creative 
inferences from constitutional principles took overtly legislative form (as with the Clarity 
Act’s putative effort to flesh out Ottawa’s obligations under the Secession Reference of 
1999). A major redefinition of what the “parliamentary” position sees as absolutely 
foundational constitutional conventions would warrant similarly explicit and forthright 
argument. Such changes ought not to be pursued by relying on and reinforcing citizens’ 
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(abysmal) ignorance of their institutional inheritance so as to smuggle in a transformation 
unnoticed (see Schneiderman 2015).  
There is thus a considerable irony in the fact that Prime Minister Harper rhetorically 
demolished his opponent by laying claim to the terrain of Canadian national identity, even 
as he  misrepresented fundamental principles of Canada’s parliamentary order. Fortunately 
– perhaps because the violation occurred only over a period of about two weeks, rather 
than forming “a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending the same 
way,” as Locke feared (1988, 415) – the damage seems not to have been long-lasting. The 
2017 provincial election in British Columbia saw the Liberal Party win a plurality of the 
popular vote but a minority of seats in the legislature, relative to the combined seats of the 
N.D.P. and the Green Party. Premier Christy Clark attempted to form a government, but 
opted not to reproduce Harper’s strategy. Instead she requested a new election, then 
fulfilled her constitutional duty to accept the lieutenant governor’s refusal of this request. 
The N.D.P. proceeded to assume government in a legislative coalition with the Greens. The 
behaviour of the main actors, and the general discourse around these events, were largely 
in keeping with what one would expect of a mature parliamentary democracy. It would be 
too great an inference to conclude that the citizenry has therefore rejected “Harper’s rules” 
– the B.C. Liberals never put them to the test – but we can conclude that people in this 
province, at least, will accept a change of government in accordance with the principles of 
responsible government and parliamentary supremacy that are here taken as the essence 
of Canada’s constitutional system. The rhetoric of one prime minister proved insufficient to 
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prime minister himself accused Stéphane Dion of a “plan to destroy our country,” and falsely 
charged that Dion hid the Canadian flag at the news conference in which the coalition was 
announced (Harper 2008a). Dion furiously spluttered that “that is such nonsense that I will not 
even reply to it…we will not respond to absolute foolishness” (Dion 2008a). This spectacle came a 
day after Dion found himself repeatedly defending his patriotism on the floor of the House of 
Commons: “I love this country and have dedicated my life to Canadian unity… when this Prime 
Minister was fighting to put firewalls around the province we all love [i.e., Alberta], I was fighting 
for clarity for this country” (the reference being to Dion’s role in crafting the Clarity Act; Dion 
2008a).  
5 “Every legal means” bore ominous implications. Transport Minister John Baird had publicly 
indicated the government’s intention to “go over the heads of the members of parliament, go over 
the heads [sic] frankly of the governor general, go right to the Canadian people.” As Lorraine E. 
Weinrib observes, “Harper controls his government’s message very tightly…for Baird to make the 
point, twice, that the government was bypassing both Parliament and the governor general, just 
before the prime minister sought prorogation of the House of Commons in unprecedented 
circumstances, gives us insight into Harper’s game plan” (2009, 68). “Every legal means” may 
reasonably be inferred to include a public relations campaign against the governor general herself, 
should she refuse a prorogation. Heard in this context, the phrase is disconcertingly close to a 
threat to the Queen’s representative, as well as to the other actors involved. 
6 Of course, the constitution may simply be incoherent. Without addressing the sort of rebuttal 
advanced by Aucoin et al., Henri Brun (2008), Guy Tremblay (2009) and Edward McWhinney, who 
calls the coalition a “coup in parliament,” (2009, 7), remain relatively close to the Harper position. 
Thus, McWhinney: “English constitutional practice…has been unbroken in always allowing a Prime 
Minister, defeated in the House on the Budget or similar, deemed grave issue, to ask for, and to 
receive on request, a Dissolution of Parliament from the head-of-state. The pragmatic conclusion 
seems clear in this wealth of historical practice since 1987: let the people – the electorate – decide 
in new general elections, as the ultimate constitutional test in a democratic polity” (8). 
7 The American constitution is characteristically more direct: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” Notwithstanding great 
differences between a head of state (U.S. president) and head of government (Canadian prime 
minister), undermining the constitution cannot be compatible with the “trust” reposed in the holder 
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